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Onlife Harms: Uber and Sexual Violence
Amanda Turnbull*

1. INTRODUCTION
Since Uber Technologies, Inc. launched in 2009 it has been operating in crisis
mode, juggling regulatory issues,1 labour relations controversies,2 intellectual
property problems,3 workplace sexual harassment concerns,4 and a deluge of
lawsuits from drivers,5 passengers,6 and governments.7 Adding to this tally of
*
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See e.g. Del Quentin Wilber & Greg Bensinger, ‘‘Uber Faces Federal Criminal Probe
Over ‘Greyball’ Software”, The Wall Street Journal (17 May 2017), online:
<www.wsj.com/articles/uber-faces-federal-criminal-probe-over-greyball-software1493948944?mod=article_inline>; Jon Henley, ‘‘Uber Clashes with Regulators in
Cities Around the World”, The Guardian (20 September 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/business/2017/sep/29/uber-clashes-with-regulators-in-cities-around-theworld>.
See e.g. Greg Bensinger, ‘‘Court Upholds Seattle Ordinance Rules Allowing Uber Union
Vote”, The Wall Street Journal (20 March 2017), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/courtupholds-seattle-ordinance-allowing-uber-union-vote-1489796331?mod=article_inline>; David Doorey, ‘‘Uber Reinvents its Controversial Arbitration Clause After Uber
v. Heller”, Canadian Law of Work Forum (1 September 2020), online (blog):
<lawofwork.ca/ubernewarbitrationclause/>.
See e.g. Jack Nicas, ‘‘Google Parent: Uber Aimed to Buy Engineer’s Startup While he
Worked for Us”, The Wall Street Journal (3 May 2017), online: <www.wsj.com/articles/
uber-planned-to-buy-engineers-startup-while-he-worked-at-alphabet-lawyers-say1493841607?mod=article_inline>; Kirsten Errick, ‘‘Uber v. Uber”, Law Street Media
(19 March 2020), online: <lawstreetmedia.com/tech/intellectual-property/uber-v-uber/
>.
See e.g. Ben DiPietro, ‘‘Crisis of the Week: Uber Faces Workplace Harassment
Concerns,” The Wall Street Journal (27 February 2017), online: <www.wsj.com/
articles/BL-252B-12256>; Jessica Guynn, ‘‘Uber Agrees to Pay $4.4 Million to Settle
EEOC Sexual Harassment and Retaliation Probe”, USA Today (18 December 2019),
online: <www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2019/12/18/uber-sexual-harassment-investigation-me-too/2694091001/>.
See e.g. O’Connor v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1133 (N.D. Cal., 2015); Singh
v. Uber Techs Inc., 235 F.Supp.3d 656 (D. N.J., 2017); Uber BV v. Aslam, [2019] UKSC
29.
See e.g. Doe v. Uber Techs Inc., 2019 U.S. Lexis 203466 (N.D. Cal.); Doe v. Uber Techs
Inc., 2017 U.S. Lexis 216416 (W.D. Miss.); Search v. Uber Techs Inc., 128 F.Supp.3d 222
(D.C., 2015); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal v. Uber Techs Inc., 103F.Supp.3d 1073 (N.D.
Cal., 2015).
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troubles, Uber has endured backlash through social media activism such as
France’s #UberCestOver hashtag on Twitter,8 which revealed stark accounts of
sexual violence perpetrated by Uber drivers, or the #DeleteUber hashtag that
arose when Uber allegedly took advantage of a taxi strike at John F. Kennedy
airport in New York following former President Donald Trump’s immigration
ban.9 #DeleteUber resurfaced10 following the publication of Susan Fowler’s
blog11 in which she detailed the sexual harassment she endured while working at
Uber as a site-reliability engineer.
As a means of addressing some of its problems, particularly lack of
transparency,12 which is a common thread in many of these crises, Uber released
7
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12

See e.g. Toronto (City) v. Uber Canada Inc., 2015 ONSC 3572, 2015 CarswellOnt 10175
(Ont. S.C.J.); Mississauga (City) v. Uber Canada Inc., 2016 ONCJ 461, 2016
CarswellOnt 12510 (Ont. C.J.); Uber Canada inc. c. Que´bec (Agence du revenu), 2016
QCCS 2158, 2016 CarswellQue 3591 (C.S. Que.), leave to appeal refused 2016
CarswellQue 7178 (C.A. Que.), leave to appeal refused Uber Canada Inc. v. Que´bec
(Agence du revenu), 2017 CarswellQue 897, 2017 CarswellQue 898 (S.C.C.).
See e.g. Sara Leduc, « #UberCestOver : quand la course Uber vire au cauchemar pour les
femmes » France 24 (3 décembre 2019), en ligne : <www.france24.com/fr/20191203ubercestover-quand-la-course-uber-vire-au-cauchemar-pour-les-femmes>; Yamily
Habib E, ‘‘Through the hashtag #UberCestOver (‘‘Uber it’s over”), thousands of
women have resorted to social media to recount in detail and denounce the harassment
and sexual assaults to which they are constantly subjected by choosing Uber to ’get home
safely’” (17 December 2019 at 14:20), online: Twitter < twitter.com/YamilyHabib/
status/1207017781381750785>.
See e.g. Elena Cresci, ‘‘#DeleteUber: How Social Media Turned on Uber”, The Guardian
(30 January 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/30/deleteuber-how-social-media-turned-on-uber>; GeekWire, ‘‘#DeleteUber starts trending
worldwide amid Trump’s anti-immigration ban; Lyft donates $1M to ACLU” (29
January 2017 at 15:10), online: Twitter <twitter.com/geekwire/status/
825798186098888705>.
See e.g. Sara Perez, ‘‘The #DeleteUber Campaign Returns Following Sexual Harassment Allegations at the Company”, Tech Crunch (22 February 2017), online:
<techcrunch.com/2017/02/22/the-deleteuber-campaign-returns-following-sexual-harassment-allegations-at-the-company/?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNhLw&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAM-bRow_4Q9ZfF4U2X8mMiI6g6s9BMMtveQwk73CKRKEM68HGOmVgCzUcOSm0T1–
zl46BX4LNNvhUfve0ur7rgYzPlFMjwlBfATEoAMMb5XafcDNef_UQbmpUIoDo2LLozZuIrAtb5M7MqjpOsTTKxiI8mirBvjQbXeJ_hY-gVH>; NYC4=Access,
‘‘An essay published by former #Ubered employee Susan Fowler detailed a prevailing
culture of #sexism and sexual #harassment at the company”, NYETA (2 February 2018
at 8:30), online: Twitter <twitter.com/NYETANYC/status/959418671566327808>.
Susan Fowler, ‘‘Reflecting on One Very, Very Strange Year at Uber” (19 February
2017), online (blog): Susan Fowler <www.susanjfowler.com/blog/2017/2/19/reflectingon-one-very-strange-year-at-uber> [Fowler, “Strange Year”].
Prior to 2018, arbitration clauses in Uber’s SFC prevented survivors of sexual violence
from moving forward with lawsuits. Silencing also perpetuates sexual violence and
prevents the public from learning about its frequency. See e.g. Sara Ashley O’Brien,
‘‘Uber Will No Longer Force Victims of Sexual Assault into Arbitration”, CNN (15 May
2018), online: <money.cnn.com/2018/05/15/technology/uber-eliminates-forced-arbi-
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its first — and only — safety report in 2019 outlining incidents that occurred
from 2017 to 2018 in the United States (US).13 It has not issued a report for any
other country. The reported data covered motor vehicle fatalities, fatal physical
assaults, and sexual assault. The 2019 Report revealed that critical safety
incidents occurred in only 0.0003% of rides.14 At first blush, this statistic seems
remarkably low, given that an average of 3.1 million trips took place daily in the
US during that time frame. However, when the data is isolated, the numbers look
different: there were 97 fatal Uber-related crashes over the two years surveyed, 15
19 fatal physical assaults,16 and — the most striking statistic — almost 6000
incidences of sexual assault.17 The sexual assault figures reflect both Uber riders
and Uber drivers as victims.18
In response, Uber developed a series of initiatives aimed at prevention,
including mandatory online anti-sexual violence training modules for drivers; 19
improved safety functionality on its apps through an emergency call function
that provides GPS location data as well as the Uber car’s make, model, and

13

14
15
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tration/index.html>; Laharee Chatterjee, ‘‘Uber, Lyft Scrap Mandatory Arbitration
for Sexual Assault Claims”, Reuters (15 May 2018), online: <www.reuters.com/article/
us-uber-sexual-harassment-idUSKCN1IG1I2>.
‘‘2017-2018 US Safety Report” (5 December 2019), online: Uber <www.uberassets.com/image/upload/v1575580686/Documents/Safety/UberUSSafetyReport_201718_FullReport.pdf > [2019 Report].
This statistic includes sexual assault. Ibid at 10.
Ibid at 51.
Ibid at 57.
Note that Uber has its own definitions for what constitutes sexual violence. If sexual
violence were more adequately defined, the number reflected in the 2019 Report would
be much greater. Ibid at 62.
Women drivers are also at risk. The 2019 Report states that 42% of those reporting
sexual assault were drivers. Uber’s reporting of this statistic, however, is not completely
clear; the driver may have been reporting an assault by one passenger on another rather
than reporting their own sexual assault. Ibid at 61. Note that while the term ‘‘survivor” is
preferable in reporting sexual violence, I have used ‘‘victim” in this instance since the
reported statistics of sexual assault include instances resulting in death.
This mandatory training is a one-time-only requirement comprised of six online videos.
New drivers will need to log a certain number of rides before completing the training.
Topics covered in the new training include the following: respecting privacy, boundaries
in conversation, respecting others’ space, sexual violence awareness, and bystander
intervention. There is no specific reference to the role that technology plays in the
available descriptions of the training. The videos will be made available in English with
subtitles for Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, Mandarin, and French Canadian. Prior to
these new mandatory training videos, Uber drivers were required to agree to community
guidelines, which included sections on sexual misconduct and how to report it, and which
outlined inappropriate behaviours. See Danielle Abril, ‘‘Uber has a New Training
Requirement for Drivers” (7 August 2020), online: Fortune <fortune.com/2020/08/07/
uber-mandatory-sexual-misconduct-assault-driver-training-u-s-canada/>; see also
Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, ‘‘Our Modules (for Uber)”, online: RAINN
<www.rainn.org/uber>.
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license plate to a 911 dispatcher;20 a data-sharing system;21 and an anonymizing
feature that disables the sharing of passenger location information to the driver
after the ride is complete.22 Uber also committed $5 million over a five-year
period to support its partner organizations working to end gender-based
violence.23
The anti-sexual violence initiatives are a response to what the 2019 Report
referred to as the ‘‘broader problem”24 — one that ‘‘almost 52.2 million
[cisgender] women and 27.6 million [cisgender] men live with every single day” 25
in the US. Uber’s post-Report initiatives are, in a sense, commendable since
creating a safer environment for everyone is important. However, emerging
scholarship on technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) 26 reveals
that Uber’s initiatives to deal with sexual violence do not adequately tackle how
technology is employed as a tool to facilitate sexually based harms. In other
words, the preventative measures that Uber put in place are insufficient and do
not properly address the problem. Correspondingly, this may be evidenced by the
caseload of nearly one thousand sexual assault allegations against drivers for
Uber, and its competitor, Lyft, that a San Francisco law firm is currently
managing — two years after the 2019 Report.27 Put most simply, Uber sidestepped dealing with the role of technology in facilitating sexual violence.
20

21

22

23

24
25
26

Dara Khosrowshahi, ‘‘Raising the Bar on Safety” (5 September 2018), online: Uber
<www.uber.com/newsroom/raisingthebar/>; see also ‘‘Uber’s Emergency Button” (14
March 2019), online: Uber <www.uber.com/newsroom/emergencybutton/>.
Kate Duffy, ‘‘Uber and Lyft are Now Sharing Data on Drivers That Have Been Banned
for Sexual or Physical Assault. Other Delivery Companies Will Join the Program, They
Said” (12 March 2019), online: Business Insider <www.businessinsider.com/uber-lyftdelivery-share-data-deactivated-drivers-sexual-assault-safety-2021-3>; Brody Ford,
‘‘Uber, Lyft to Share Data on Deactivated Drivers in Safety Push” (11 March 2021),
online: Bloomberg <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-11/uber-lyft-toshare-data-on-deactivated-drivers-in-safety-push>.
Khosrowshahi, supra note 20; ‘‘Uber to Disable Creepy Customer-Tracking Feature”,
Reuters (29 August 2017), online: NY Post <nypost.com/2017/08/29/uber-to-disablecreepy-customer-tracking-feature/>.
Tracey Breeden, ‘‘Driving Change — Uber’s $5 Million Commitment to Prevent Sexual
Assault and Domestic Violence” (5 November 2017), online: Uber <www.uber.com/enQA/newsroom/driving-change-together/>; in Canada, Uber extended ongoing partnerships with YWCA Canada and WomanACT, and it began new partnerships with
EVA BC and Le Chaı̂non. See ‘‘Driving Change — Our Commitment to Combat
Gender-Based Violence in Canada” (27 May 2021), online: Uber Canada <www.uber.com/en-CA/newsroom/driving-change-our-commitment-to-combat-gender-basedviolence-in-canada/>.
2019 Report, supra note 13 at 6.
Ibid at 58.
See e.g. Suzie Dunn, ‘‘Is it Actually Violence? Framing Technology Facilitated Harms as
Violence” in Asher Flynn, Nicola Henry & Jane Bailey, eds, Technology-Facilitated
Violence & Abuse: International Perspectives and Experiences (Australia: Emerald
Publishing, 2021) 25.

ONLIFE HARMS: UBER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE

281

This paper argues that Uber needs a better understanding of the
phenomenon of TFGBV. Uber’s lack of engagement with the role of
technology in its sexual violence prevention measures demonstrates that it has
not properly addressed its problem with sexual violence. The path to properly
grappling with this is through an understanding of TFGBV as being situated on
a continuum of interconnected behaviours.28 After all, properly identifying a
problem provides clarity at both the organizational level and in society more
generally.29 This argument will unfold in three parts: first, through an
explanation of TFGBV and the role digital platforms play in its propagation;
second, through an analysis of Uber’s platform infrastructure and TFGBV,
framed by Uber’s toxic corporate climate of sexual harassment; and third,
through a discussion of the direction that Uber may take in light of recognizing
TFGBV and its impact.

2. THE CONTINUUM OF COERCION AND CONTROL30: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
This section explains the concept of TFGBV and how it proliferates via
Uber’s infrastructure.

(a) Technology Heightens the Global Emergency
TFGBV arises out of ‘‘misogyny, sexist norms, and rape culture, all of which
existed long before the Internet.”31 It is a furtherance or elaboration of genderbased violence32 that affects approximately 736 million women worldwide.33 Put
succinctly, gender-based violence is a ‘‘global emergency.” 34 Moreover,
27

28
29
30

31

32

33

See Brendan Cole, ‘‘Uber and Lyft Face Nearly 1,000 Sexual Assault Claims Against
Their Drivers”, Newsweek (1 July 2021), online: <www.newsweek.com/uber-lyft-facenearly-1000-sexual-assault-claims-against-drivers-1605864>; see also Tom Maxwell,
‘‘Uber and Lyft May Soon be Hit with Hundreds of Sexual Assault Lawsuits” (1 July
2021), online: Input <www.inputmag.com/tech/california-law-firm-plans-1000-lawsuits-against-uber-lyft-over-sexual-assaults>; Ethan Baron, ‘‘Dozens of Women Sue
Uber Claiming Drivers Sexually Attacked Them”, Mercury News (29 June 2021), online:
<www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/29/dozens-of-women-sue-uber-claiming-driverssexually-attacked-them/>.
Dunn, supra note 26 at 30.
Ibid. at 40.
See Liz Kelly, ‘‘The Continuum of Sexual Violence” in Mary Maynard & Jalna Hanmer,
eds, Women, Violence and Social Control (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1987) 46.
Cynthia Khoo, ‘‘Deplatforming Misogyny: Report on Platform Liability for Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence” (2021), online: Women’s Legal Education &
Action Fund (LEAF) <www.leaf.ca/publication/deplatforming-misogyny/> at 15.
Anastasia Powell & Nicola Henry, Sexual Violence in a Digital Age (London: Palgrave,
2017) at 23.
‘‘Facts and Figures: Ending Violence Against Women”, online: UN Women <www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-and-figures>.
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technology heightens this global emergency: ‘‘85 per cent of women globally have
witnessed or experienced online violence, with young women facing heightening
risk.”35 Further, the violence intensifies when broadening the definition of
‘‘women” to include both cis- and transgender women and girls, and those who
hold intersecting marginalized identities. In taking an intersectional approach to
identity, the scope of violence also escalates to include the additional harms
associated with the broadened scope, such as transphobic violence.
Like the work done previously by feminists who fought to have ‘‘boys will be
boys” behaviour recognized as sexual harassment,36 Suzie Dunn explains the
same challenges of tolerance and understating harms exist around technologyfacilitated violence such as online stalking and other behaviours used to degrade
women.37 Lawmakers and the public more generally have not come to terms with
whether technology-facilitated behaviours are in fact forms of violence. 38 Failure
to recognize the role that technology plays in facilitating abuse may further
exacerbate the existing barriers to reporting sexual assault that Elaine Craig
identifies in the justice system.39
Uber’s response to its problem with sexual violence demonstrates that it has
not come to grips with technology-facilitated behaviours. It omits reference to
the role that technology played in facilitating sexual violence in its safety report
and consequently in its preventative measures. Indeed, the case law from Canada
and the US involving Uber and sexual violence demonstrates that courts, too, are
floundering to understand the role that technology plays.40
34

35
36

37
38
39

40

‘‘Trailblazing Leaders Commit to End Gender-Based Violence, Drive Equality in
Technology and Innovation, and Ensure Economic Justice and Rights for Women and
Girls at the Generation Equality Forum”, (2 July 2021), online: UN Women <www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2021/7/news-gef-paris-leaders-commit-to-end-gbv-driveequality-in-tech-and-ensure-economic-justice>.
Ibid.
See e.g. Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Sheila MacIntyre, ‘‘Gender Bias within
the Law School: The Memo and Its Impact” (1987) 2:2 CJWL 362; Constance
Backhouse, The Secret Oppression: Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Toronto:
Macmillan, 1979); Constance Backhouse, Sexual Harassment on the Job: How to Avoid
the Working Woman’s Nightmare (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 1981).
Dunn, supra note 26 at 40.
Ibid.
See Elaine Craig, Putting Trials on Trial: Sexual Assault and the Failure of the Legal
Profession (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2018); see also Khoo, supra
note 31 at 51-52.
R. v. Ali, 2019 ONSC 5740, 2019 CarswellOnt 16059 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Singh, 2019
ONSC 4331, 2019 CarswellOnt 11742 (Ont. S.C.J.); Doe v. Uber Techs, Inc., 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 109092, 2021 WL 2382837 (D. Md., 2021); Doe v. Uber Techs, Inc., 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203466, 2019 WL 6251189 (N.D. Cal., 2019); Doe v. Uber Techs, Inc.,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83462, 2017 WL 2352032 (N.D. Cal., 2017); MM v. Police
Prosecutions, [2021] SASC 1; N v. Police, [2021] SASC 49; Muhammad Naveed v. R.,
[2019] NSWCCA 149.
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TFGBV may ‘‘be recognized by looking for behaviors that control,
dominate, and instill fear in the person targeted.”41 These behaviours may
range from hate speech, voyeurism, spying or monitoring through account
hacking, defamation, non-consensual distribution of intimate images (NCDII),
and stalking.42 Some phenomena are unique to TFGBV, such as abuse occurring
simultaneously in several locations,43 the scope of the audience that is witness to
the abuse,44 and the replicability of digital content.
TFGBV breaks down the distinction between the online and the offline
worlds. The perception that there is a contrast between gender-based violence in
the online and offline worlds effectively creates a ‘‘false dichotomy” 45 given that
‘‘technologies play an increasingly central part in where and how we work, learn,
play and communicate.”46 The solution of simply reducing or avoiding online
activities, which is a common response to online abuse and harassment, is not a
realistic solution, since it deprives or restricts individuals from fully participating
in the contemporary public sphere.47 Mireille Hildebrandt’s notion of the
‘‘onlife” world ‘‘singles out the fact that our ‘real’ life is neither on- nor offline,”
48
and it is a life that we are still discovering. This is helpful in thinking about
how TFGBV is both an evolving and cross-cutting issue.
In the recent Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund report,
‘‘Deplatforming Misogyny,” Cynthia Khoo finds that ‘‘[n]early all TFGBV on
digital platforms is committed through online expression, whether through
speech, images, videos, or other multimedia.”49 ‘‘Nearly all” implies that a
majority of TFGBV is committed through online expression. The TFGBV
related to Uber, as this paper will show, is a splinter group — or a minority — in
that the design of the platform itself is one that enables coercion and control
through algorithmic governance as well as one that intersects with other
technologies that create opportunities for TFGBV, such as Snapchat. 50 Since
technology is the product of its design, the TFGBV associated with Uber is

41
42
43

44

45
46
47
48

49
50

Dunn, supra note 26 at 40.
For a more complete list, see ibid at 30.
Jane Bailey & Carissima Mathen, ‘‘Technology-Facilitated Violence Against Women &
Girls: Assessing the Canadian Criminal Response” (2019) 97:3 Can Bar Rev 664 at 676.
Suzie Dunn, ‘‘Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence: An Overview” (7
December 2020), online: Centre for International Governance Innovation < https://
www.cigionline.org/publications/technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence-overview/> at 4.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 15.
Powell & Henry, supra note 32 at 51.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 2.
Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law (Northampton, MA:
Elgar Publishing, 2015) at 42.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 2.
‘‘Snapchat”, online: <www.snapchat.com>.
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generated through Uber’s default settings and via online expression. We could
say then that the devil is in both the defaults51 and the dissemination.
Moreover, online platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and others have
become in some cases general hubs of expression-based TFGBV, 52 while some
‘‘purpose-built platforms” exist solely for its perpetuation, such as ‘‘The Dirty,”
which was established for the purpose of NCDII.53 Simply put, technology gets
employed as a tool by perpetrators to broaden the scope of violence and to
facilitate abusive behaviour.54

(b) What is a Platform?
It is worth elucidating what is meant by ‘‘platform” in the context of this
paper since it is not uniformly used across differing discourses. Platforms
facilitate ‘‘transactions between buyers and sellers.”55 In the pre-digital context, a
village market is a good example of a platform in that it reduces the costs of
transacting through bringing together large numbers of buyers and sellers. 56
Online platforms may be described as
services that a) host, organize, and circulate users’ shared content or
social interactions for them, b) without having produced or commissioned (the bulk of) that content, c) built on an infrastructure, beneath
that circulation of information, for processing data for customer
service, advertising, and profit.57

Digital platforms wield the power of information goods represented in bits such
as software and banking services.58 They are ‘‘characterized by near-zero
marginal cost — of access, reproduction, and distribution.”59 Platforms may also
be connected to goods and services in the physical world — involving atoms. 60
These platforms are known as ‘‘O2O” — or online to offline, whereby the online
world is spread to the offline world. Interestingly, the tech jargon itself — O2O
51
52

53
54
55

56
57

58

59
60

Ian Kerr, ‘‘The Devil Is in the Defaults” (2017) 4:1 Critical Analysis of L 91.
For example, Khoo notes, ‘‘Facebook has allowed pages glorifying intimate-partner
violence to stand, while removing images of women breastfeeding.” See Khoo, supra note
31 at 2.
Ibid. at 3.
Dunn, supra note 26 at 3.
Andrew Shipilov, ‘‘Don’t Confuse Platforms with Ecosystems” (22 December 2020),
online (blog): Insead Knowledge .
Ibid.
Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the
Hidden Decisions that Shape Social Media (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018) at
18.
Andrew McAfee & Eric Brynjolfsson, Machine, Platform, Crowd: Harnessing Our
Digital Future (New York: Norton, 2017) at 185.
Ibid. at 135.
Ibid. at 185.
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— spells out that online harm will spread to the offline world. The O2O platform
then corroborates the falsehood of the dichotomy between gender-based violence
in the online and offline worlds.61 It also reifies Hildebrandt’s use of the term
‘‘onlife.”62
Uber’s central platform is O2O. It ‘‘brings together the economics of bits
with those of atoms.”63 It is onlife.64 Its platform was built on a very simple idea:
hail a car with nothing but a smartphone. Other examples of companies
employing O2O models include Airbnb, which connects people who wish to rent
out their homes with those who are interested in an accommodation alternative
to hotels,65 and Groupon, a group buying site connecting subscribers with local
merchants that offer discounts on goods and services, travel, and other
activities.66
Digital platforms, however, may be ‘‘central sites of TFGBV.” 67 Their
particular, common features in addition to the distinguishing characteristics of
technology transform and heighten the nature and magnitude of gender-based
violence.68 For instance, the affordances69 of online platforms in addition to their
business models exploit aggressive behaviours.70 To demonstrate this point, Uber
has experimented with video gaming techniques and graphics to nudge drivers
into working longer hours.71 This is known as ‘‘gamification.”72 Uber has also
leveraged some drivers’ competitive tendencies, alerting them that they are close
to hitting a particular goal when they try to log off73 or sending them their next
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

70
71

72
73

Khoo, supra note 31 at 15.
Hildebrandt, supra note 48.
McAfee & Brynjolfsson, supra note 58 at 186.
Hildebrandt, supra note 48.
Airnbnb (2021), online: <www.airbnb.ca>.
Groupoun (2021), online: <www.groupon.ca>.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 47.
Ibid.
The term ‘‘affordance” was coined by James J. Gibson in 1979 as follows: ‘‘The
affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or
furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, the noun
affordance is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers to both the
environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the
complementarity of the animal and the environment.” See James J Gibson, The
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1979) at 127.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 48.
Noam Scheiber, ‘‘How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons”,
NYT (2 April 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/
uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html>; Jonathan Compo, ‘‘Pay to Play (And Work):
Uber’s Insidious Exploitation”, The Pavlovic Today (21 May 2019), online: <thepavlovictoday.com/pay-to-play-and-work-ubers-insidious-exploitation/>.
Compo, ibid.
Scheiber, supra note 71.

286 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

fare possibility prior to finishing the one they are completing. 74 We know that
there is a link between competitive behaviour and aggression, particularly in the
context of gaming.75
Platforms also create a sense of anonymity that reduces the risk of being
identified or caught when engaging in abusive or violent behaviours. 76 Twitter,
for example, allows users to create anonymous/multiple accounts and resists
policing expression. 77 Taken together, this combination of features
accommodates abusive and violent behaviour. Platform affordances may also
be exploited in order to enact abuse.78 In the context of Uber, a good example of
this is account sharing that is solicited online through chat rooms and Facebook
groups.79 In 2019, Transport for London determined that 14,000 Uber rides from
late 2018 through 2019 were not conducted by registered Uber drivers, but by
others who had been able to substitute their photos and make use of a real Uber
driver’s account.80 Forty-three drivers in London81 had managed to trick the
Uber app into updating their profile photo, which allowed drivers to temporarily
transfer access to their accounts to someone else — to others who lack a valid
driver’s license, for example. This makes identifying the driver more difficult.
Other strategies, such as when Twitter users ‘‘tweet and delete” abusive
content before it can be flagged for removal, are examples of how platforms can
further accommodate behaviour such as harassment. What is more, the
boundaries of digital platforms may be fluid; Reddit, for example, combines
social media, messaging, video-sharing, and pornography. 82 Thus, as Khoo
explains, these elements are not just aspects of TFGBV, but of ‘‘platformed
TFGBV.”83
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See e.g. Wai Yen Tang & Jesse Fox, ‘‘Men’s Harassment Behaviour in Online Video
Games: Personality Traits and Game Factors” (2016) 42:6 Aggressive Behaviour 513.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 48.
See ‘‘Guidelines for Law Enforcement”, Twitter (2021), online: <help.twitter.com/en/
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Khoo, supra note 31 at 48.
See Parmy Olson & Sarah E Needleman, ‘‘Uber’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Shared Driver
Accounts,” The Wall Street Journal (27 November 2019), online: <www.wsj.com/
articles/ubers-dirty-little-secret-shared-driver-accounts-11574883278>; see also Dara
Kerr, ‘‘Some Uber Drivers use Bogus Identities and Shared Accounts”, (26 November
2019), online: CNET <www.cnet.com/news/uber-drivers-using-fake-identities-isntjust-a-london-problem/>.
Olson & Needleman, ibid.
Ibid.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 45.
Ibid. at 49.
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(c) It’s a technology company! It’s a transportation service! No, it’s a
megatrend!
In addition to clarifying what is a platform generally, it is also worth
shedding some light on what exactly Uber does.84 Is it a technology company? Or
is it a taxi alternative? Uber pitches itself as a technology company that offers
services including ride-hailing, food delivery, package delivery, couriers, and
freight transportation.85 But it is not of the Apple,86 Microsoft,87 Amazon,88 or
Alibaba89 sort of ‘‘tech giants” that compete in hardware, software, and
technology services. All these giants had much more humble beginnings before
expanding their product lines and services: Apple sold computers, Microsoft
dealt in software, Amazon retailed books, and Alibaba began as a website
focused on China’s commerce. 90 Uber, however, began as an emerging
technology, leading a ‘‘megatrend”91 blending technology and transportation
as a service rather than a product. It is sometimes also referred to as a ‘‘gig
economy” platform,92 connecting freelance workers with customers to provide
short-term services.
Uber’s O2O platform straddles the online and the offline worlds. It also
merges machine capabilities and human troubleshooters at its corporate level,
thus spanning the human-machine divide. Uber’s entire infrastructure —
including software, servers, and its mechanism for executing transactions — is
managed by ‘‘an engineering ecosystem consisting of hundreds of thousands of
machines supported by. . ..[human] engineers.”93 In other words, the platform is
84

85
86
87
88
89
90
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Brian Fung, ‘‘Uber Isn’t a Tech Company It’s Basically a Taxi Company EU Court
Advisor Says”, Washington Post (11 May 2017), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/11/uber-isnt-a-tech-company-its-basically-a-taxi-company-eu-court-adviser-says/>; Anne Sraders, ‘‘Uber vs. Taxi: What’s the Difference?” (27
February 2019), online: The Street <www.thestreet.com/technology/uber-vs-taxi14872678>.
‘‘Uber” (2021), online: <www.uber.com/ca/en/>.
‘‘Apple” (2021), online: <www.apple.com/ca/>.
‘‘Microsoft” (2021), online: <www.microsoft.com/en-ca/?spl=2>.
‘‘Amazon” (2021), online: <www.amazon.ca>.
‘‘Alibaba” (2021), online: <www.alibaba.com/?__redirected__=1>.
See Bowdeya Tweh & Katherine Riley, ‘‘Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple and
Microsoft. Call Them Tech Frenemies for Life”, The Wall Street Journal (1 April 2021),
online: <www.wsj.com/articles/tech-giants-cooperate-while-competing-frenemies-forlife-11617293819>; see also Brian O’Connell, ‘‘History of Alibaba: Timeline and Facts”
(30 October 2019), online: The Street: <www.thestreet.com/world/history-of-alibaba15145103>.
Other technology-services following the Uber model include Lyft, Curb, Gett, Wingz,
Via, Scoop, Flywheel, Bridj.
See e.g. ‘‘Digital Labour Platforms”, International Labour Organization (2021), online:
<www.ilo.org/global/topics/non-standard-employment/crowd-work/lang–en/index.htm>.
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regulated by algorithms. Users of this platform include drivers, consumers,
restaurants, shippers, and carriers.94
The term ‘‘ecosystem” is borrowed from biology and ‘‘generally refers to a
group of interacting [organizations] that depend on each other’s activities.” 95 The
borrowed term ‘‘ecosystem” may be used in multiple ways: it may describe an
economic community of interacting actors; it may explain how an innovation
and surrounding support components interact; it may articulate the
interdependent nature of digital platforms, their sponsors, and their
complementors.96 Uber employs the term in the latter manner — a platform
ecosystem. Its business model comprises of its main platform with crossorganizational collaboration. To further elaborate, a platform ecosystem takes a
‘‘‘hub and spoke’ operational format, with an array of peripheral firms
connected to its central platform,”97 and it may therefore be seen as a ‘‘semiregulated marketplace.”98 Uber has continuously expanded its ecosystem from
ride-hailing to food delivery, electric bicycles, scooters, and, more recently, to
payment systems.99
The following chart demonstrates how platforms and ecosystems interact:
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‘‘Uber Infrastructure in 2019: Improving Reliability, Driving Customer Satisfaction”
(19 December 2019), online: Uber Engineering <eng.uber.com/uber-infrastructure2019/>.
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Michael G Jacobides, Carmelo Cennamo & Annabell Gawer, ‘‘Towards a Theory of
Ecosystems” (2018) 39:8 Strategic Management J 2255 at 2256.
Ibid. at 2257-58.
Ibid. at 2258.
Jonathan Wareham, Paul B Fox & Josep Lluı́s Cano Giner, ‘‘Technology Ecosystem
Governance” (2014) 25:4 Organization Science 1195 at 1211.
‘‘Get More for Your Money with Uber Cash” (2021), online: Uber <www.uber.com/ca/
en/ride/how-it-works/uber-cash/>.
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Figure 1: Platforms and ecosystems may exist in four different model
permutations.100
Section A is neither a platform nor an ecosystem: it is a stand-alone value chain.
Section B is an ecosystem but not a platform: for example, a private equity firm
may purchase a business that brings capital as well as other capabilities and
services. A cluster of expertise then arises with a central group as leader, thus
resulting in an ecosystem. Section C is a platform but not an ecosystem: it
connects transactions between two parties, and the value lies in the transaction
itself. Section D is both an ecosystem and a platform: it links buyers and sellers
for transactions across various businesses, providing a shared solution. The
transactions are generated through the exchange of customer data. Uber is an
example of a platform ecosystem.
We know that TFGBV exists on a continuum of coercion and control. 101 We
also know that the affordances of online platforms, particularly when managed
by algorithms, optimize abusive and violent behaviours. 102 Uber’s onlife
100
101

Shipilov, supra note 55.
Kelly, supra note 30.
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infrastructure connects its central platform to other goods and services in a ‘‘hub
and spoke” paradigm, resulting in not only sexual violence associated with its
platform, but also associated in a cluster of other intersecting ways. Put
differently, the affordances of Uber’s platform ecosystem business model provide
an ecosystem of platformed TFGBV — or, more simply, ecosystemic TFGBV.
Moreover, the backdrop to this ecosystemic TFGBV is Uber’s history of toxic
corporate culture that perpetuated and covered up sexual violence.

(d) ‘‘When Worlds Collide”103: Uber’s toxic culture and its hub and spoke
paradigm
To understand Uber’s ecosystem of TFGBV, it is necessary to understand its
sexist culture. Misogyny is like smog. It creates a haze that reduces visibility. It
seeps into every available space possible. It can combine with other pollutants,
resulting in an even more unhealthy environment. It can be generated locally, but
it can also come from afar. It is harmful to everyone in the long term.
(i) Uber’s toxic corporate culture
Uber was founded in 2009 in San Francisco and grew rapidly by hiring
decentralized employees who were ‘‘empowered to establish Uber’s operations
with lightning speed” in each new area in which it was gaining popularity. 104 In
the spring of 2010, Uber unveiled the beta version of its smartphone app. 105 Its
culture and its app, then, developed together.
In February 2017, Susan Fowler posted a blog detailing the sexual
harassment she endured while working at Uber as an engineer.106 It revealed
an all too familiar, toxic tale. Fowler made a complaint as a new employee that
her manager was sexually harassing her. She was told her manager ‘‘‘was a high
performer’ (i.e. had stellar performance reviews from his superiors) and [that]
they wouldn’t feel comfortable punishing him for what was probably just an
innocent mistake on his part.“107
102
103

104

105
106

107

Khoo, supra note 31 at 47.
When Worlds Collide is a 1951 science fiction film in which scientists race against time to
build a rocket ship to save a select group of individuals before the star of a newly
identified planet collides with Earth. See Rudolph Maté, ‘‘When World Collide”, online:
IMDB <www.imdb.com/title/tt0044207/>; it also refers to a 1999 industrial metal hit
song. See Powerman 5000, ‘‘When Worlds Collide”, online (video): YouTube
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=lsV500W4BHU>.
Alex Rosenblat, Uberland: How Algorithms are Rewriting the Rules of Work (Oakland:
University of California Press, 2018) at 25.
Ibid. at 21.
Fowler, ‘‘Strange Year,” supra note 11; see also Susan Fowler, ‘‘I Spoke Out Against
Sexual Harassment at Uber. The Aftermath Was More Terrifying Than Anything I
Faced Before” (17 February 2020), online: Time <time.com/5784464/susan-fowlerbook-uber-sexual-harassment/>; Susan Fowler, Whistleblower: My Journey to Silicon
Valley and Fight for Justice at Uber (New York: Penguin, 2020).
Fowler, ‘‘Strange Year,” supra note 11.
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Fowler was given the choice to find another team at Uber or to stay where she
was, but she was told she would likely receive a poor performance review if she
remained on the same team. Fowler opted for the former and moved teams only
to discover through befriending other women engineers that others had made
similar complaints about the same man. It was not, as she had been told, his first
offence.
Fowler’s blog post affirmed another all too familiar toxic tale: metric
power108 outweighed ethical business practice. Uber only reacted when Fowler’s
complaint became public, showing that their obligation to uphold moral
standards and live up to the expectations of stakeholders and society more
broadly was secondary to its potential profit-making.
Fowler’s blog led to an investigation.109 It also boosted the existing social
media boycott campaign #DeleteUber.110 Within four months of the blog, Uber
CEO Travis Kalanick resigned after shareholders made it untenable for him to
continue.111 Dara Khosrowshahi, whose reputation has been characterized as
‘‘not your typical tech bro” and, more recently, ‘‘Dad of Silicon Valley,” 112was
hired to replace Kalanick as CEO and clean up Uber’s toxic corporate culture. 113
Internal investigations led to more than 20 dismissals for unethical behaviour. 114
The 2019 Report was penned under Khosrowshahi’s leadership. 115 Mandatory
arbitration for sexual violence claims was jettisoned, 116 and within a week of that
108

109

110
111

112

113

114

115
116
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defines it as a concept that focuses ‘‘on the relation between measurement, circulation
and possibility.” See David Beer, Metric Power (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016) at
171.
Uber’s CEO, Travis Kalanick, stated it was the first time that the issue of sexual violence
in the workplace had come to his attention. See Mike Isaac, ‘‘Uber Investigating Sexual
Harassment Claims by Ex-Employee”, NYT (19 February 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/02/19/business/uber-sexual-harassment-investigation.html>.
Perez, supra note 10.
See Mike Isaac, ‘‘Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O.”, NYT (21 June
2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick.html>; see also Zoe Kleinman, ‘‘Uber: The Scandals that Drove Travis Kalanick
Out”, BBC News, (21 June 2017), online: <www.bbc.com/news/technology40352868>.
Maureen Dowd, ‘‘Dara Khosrowshahi, Dad of Silicon Valley”, NYT (16 July 2021),
online: <www.nytimes.com/2021/07/16/style/uber-ceo-dara-khosrowshahi.html>.
Dara Kerr, ‘‘Uber’s U-Turn: How the New CEO is Cleaning House after Scandals and
Lawsuits”, CNET (27 April 2018), online: <www.cnet.com/news/ubers-u-turn-howceo-dara-khosrowshahi-is-cleaning-up-after-scandals-and-lawsuits/>.
See Dong Ngo & Dara Kerr, ‘‘Uber Fires 20 Employees in Harassment Investigation”,
CNET (6 June 2017), online: <www.cnet.com/news/uber-fires-20-employees-in-harassment-investigation/>.
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See Daisuke Wakabayashi, ‘‘Uber Eliminates Forced Arbitration for Sexual Miscon-
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decision, another woman engineer came forward with a sexual harassment
lawsuit.117
Notwithstanding the changes that Uber was making, including its claim it
would no longer tolerate ‘‘brilliant jerks,”118 the effects of sexual harassment are
unabating.119 In fact, while Uber was investigating its problem with sexual
harassment of its employees, it was simultaneously overlooking its women
drivers.120 One driver reported that it took her three years of ‘‘crying for help”
into the void of ‘‘‘bro-fraternity’ culture” until an actual Uber employee called
her to discuss the repeated harassment that she was experiencing. 121
This was the culture in which Uber’s platform was developed, and we know
that organizational background plays a role in perpetuating misogyny, sexism,
and homophobia.122 We also know that corporations place their own pursuits
ahead of everyone else.123 Since Uber was insensitive to issues of sexual
harassment as it developed as an organization, it was likely insensitive to the fact
that the same discrimination was developing in tandem in its technology. After
all, the ‘‘brilliant jerks” that were initially tolerated and who were supported by
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See Katina Sawyer & Christian Thoroughgood, ‘‘Fixing a Toxic Culture Like Uber’s
Requires More Than Just a New CEO”, The Conversation (21 June 2017), online:
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<theintercept.com/2017/05/04/as-uber-probes-sexual-harassment-at-its-offices-itoverlooks-hundreds-of-thousands-of-female-drivers/?curator=TechREDEF>.
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Touchstone Term”, NYT (8 March 2019), online: <www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/
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See Charles Duhigg, ‘‘How Companies Learn Your Secrets”, NYT (16 February 2012),
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Uber’s corporate culture had to think like misogynists to act like them. They are
mutually inclusive factors.
Misogynistic foundations have implications for the cycle of data gathering.
How and where is the data that is necessary to develop the Uber algorithms being
mined? These foundations also have implications in the design phase: what
questions are being asked? What are the potential harms posed by this
technology?
‘‘AI is a mirror of ourselves,”124 and so misogyny within an organization’s
culture, teamed up with the significant gender gap of AI professionals, 125 results
in bias in Machine Learning (ML) algorithms.126 A good example of this is
Microsoft’s experiment with its now infamous Twitter chatbot, ‘‘Tay,” that
‘‘learned” by reading tweets and interacting with other users. Within only a few
hours of being exposed to others, Tay was producing offensive tweets, like, ‘‘I
fucking hate feminists and they should all die and burn in hell.” 127 Tay was taken
down within 24 hours of being released.
Gender bias in the design and use of AI models poses significant
disadvantage for women.128 In the auto industry, for instance, seatbelts,
headrests, and airbags in cars are designed from data acquired from crash test
dummies that have a male physique. They do not take women’s physique into
account; thus, women are 17% more likely to die than a man in a similar
accident.129
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Guardian (24 March 2016), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/24/
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Regulators”, Forbes (2 March 2020), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/carmenniethammer/2020/03/02/ai-bias-could-put-womens-lives-at-riska-challenge-for-regulators/
?sh=79377c5d534f>; see also Josh Feast, ‘‘4 Ways to Address Gender Bias in AI”,
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The recent work of Timnit Gebru and Joy Buolamwini demonstrates how
gender and racial bias are replicated in ML algorithms. Gebru is an outspoken
critic of unethical AI. Her co-authored work on the risks of AI trained on vast
quantities of text resulted in Google forcing her out of her job, even though she
was doing the very job she was hired to do.130 Lack of diversity in Google’s
workforce created an impenetrable barrier for Gebru: only 10 per cent of AI
research staff at Google are women.131 Furthermore, Black women make up only
1.6 per cent of Google’s entire workforce.132 When Gebru revealed Google’s
onlife harms, it was easier for Google to get rid of her than to actually address
the problems. Improving AI ethics internally to effect change externally becomes
simply lip service if the person carrying the burden of the work is unsupported
and ultimately dispensable.
Buolamwini, a ‘‘poet of code” who works in the public interest to ensure
equal access to technology, identified the ‘‘coded gaze” whereby engineers who
coded facial analysis software had not provided sufficiently diverse datasets for
programs to learn what is/is not a face.133 This bias can lead to discrimination
and social exclusion. It ‘‘excodes” individuals, a term that Buolamwini came up
with to describe those who are already marginalized in society and who suffer
most when algorithms govern.134
Good data can reduce bias generally, but only if the right issues are being
contemplated in the data collection processes and only if the right questions are
being asked in the design phase. In Uber’s case, however, Uber had an
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<www.youtube.com/watch?v=gkbNH39QE0Q>; see also Joy Buolamwini, ‘‘The
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established culture of sexual harassment and cover up. It was not attuned to the
ways in which its platform could be used to facilitate gender-based violence.

(e) The Hub Effect
The next section investigates the Uber platform as a site of TFGBV through
examples of Canadian and US case law and news reporting. It examines both
technology-facilitated behaviours that are legally recognized as violence as well
behaviours that should be understood as violence. I have purposely discluded the
names of perpetrators from the text so as not to bring attention to them.135 I
have purposely anonymized the names of survivors out of respect. The following
section of this paper also deals with content that may disturbing for some
readers. The section will deal first with Uber drivers as perpetrators of TFGBV,
and second, with passengers as perpetrators.
(i) Uber drivers as perpetrators of TFGBV
On March 31, 2019, E.E. did not expect that her Uber driver would invite her
out for a coffee or a glass of wine at the end of her short trip in Newark, New
Jersey, a distance that she would otherwise have walked, had it not been
raining.136 Nor did she expect the driver to return to her home, uninvited, and
leave a letter at her door later that evening, inviting her out again. The following
day, the driver was waiting in his car when E.E. went to take her dog for a walk,
alleging that he was simply in the neighbourhood. She reported him to Uber. She
heard nothing back. Two days later, he was waiting for her in a park where she
normally walked her dog. She called the police. The driver admitted he was
waiting for E.E. She was advised to file a restraining order. By the end of the
week, she was no longer sleeping at home for fear that he would appear when she
least expected it. She filed a Harassment Prevention Order as a temporary
solution. Two weeks later, E.E. had to appear in court to make it permanent. The
Order was granted for one year.
How did the driver know where E.E. lived? How did he gain insight to her
daily routines that allowed him to follow her? The answer lies in the Uber
platform.137
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down women. See Andrew Wyrich, ‘‘Facebook Employees Accused of Accessing
Personal Data to Track Women” (13 July 2021), online: DailyDot <www.dailydot.com/
debug/facebook-employee-user-data-track-woman-new-book/>; see also Sheera Frenkel & Cecilia Kang, An Ugly Truth: Inside Facebook’s Battle for Domination (New York:
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In Canada, stalking is recognized as a form of criminal harassment under the
Criminal Code.138 It affects approximately 8% of women aged 15 and older in
Canadian society, versus 5% of men.139 Stalking may also occur online —
‘‘cyberstalking” — or be aggravated by technology such as spyware or GPS
locators.140 The technology intensifies the harms inherent in the act of
stalking.141 TFGBV replaces the term ‘‘cyberstalking” to avoid the artificial
chasm between the online and offline spheres.142
In another incident on August 1, 2018, N.I. requested an Uber Pool ride143 to
take her from her home in Mississauga, Ontario to work in Toronto. 144 She was
20 years old, working part time at a grocery store while also enrolled in an
educational program. She also had a learning disability and a mild speech
impediment. The Uber app permitted the driver to cancel a third-party request
mid-journey after initially accepting it, which allowed him to depart from the
originally planned route, ostensibly to pick up the new passenger. Cancelling the
Pool ride meant that the driver was able to undo the safety in numbers
precaution that is one key benefit of carpooling and that N.I. had chosen by
requesting the Pool ride.145
N.I. ended up alone in the vehicle, diverted from the main route that would
have taken her to work, and already uncomfortable since the driver had asked a
series of personal and sex-related questions. He had also asked her to move into
the front passenger seat more than once. She eventually conceded with the hope
that he would just get back onto the highway and take her to work on time.
Instead, he put her hand on his lap and then forced her hand under his shorts and
underwear to sexually stimulate him. He also asked her to have sex/perform oral
sex at a nearby park. Eventually, he continued back onto the highway and
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pub/75-006-x/2018001/article/54973-eng.htm>.
Khoo, supra note 31 at 30.
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Jane Bailey, Valerie Steeves & Suzie Dunn, ‘‘Submission to the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women Re: Regulating Online Violence and Harassment Against
Women” (27 September 2017), online (pdf): eQuality Project, <www.equalityproject.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Bailey-Steeves-Dunn-Submission-27-Sep-2017.pdf>
at 3; see also Khoo, supra note 31 at 29.
‘‘Uber Pool”, Uber (2021), online: <www.uber.com/ca/en/ride/uberpool/>.
R. v. Alobedi, 2020 ONSC 4670, 2020 CarswellOnt 11598 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Arguably, N.I. could have been dropped off last when the Uber algorithm calculated the
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system” is one method of increasing women’s safety. See e.g. ‘‘Women’s Safety on
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requested her phone number before dropping her at work so he could meet her
later. N.I. provided him with a false number and got out of the vehicle.
N.I. reported the incident to Uber later that day and provided more details
the following day when Uber requested them. N.I. wanted to be reassured she
would never have him as a driver again. She also expressed to Uber that she was
worried that he knew where she lived and how to find her. On August 5, 2018,
she believed that she saw the driver at her place of work. N.I. reported the entire
incident to the police that day.
How could the driver have changed the terms N.I. had chosen to make her
trip to work? How did he gain insight into her part-time work schedule that
allowed him to show up days later? Again, the answer lies in the Uber platform.
N.I. was sexually assaulted. Her life is forever changed by someone who
perceived his needs and feelings to be more important than hers.146 Sexual
assault is an under-reported crime: only 5% of sexual assaults get reported to
police.147 It is also the only violent crime in Canada that is not declining. 148 Craig
explains,
[t]he relationship between sexual assault, gender hierarchy, and shame
is further aggravated by the continued acceptance of, or reliance on,
problematic assumptions about sexuality and sexual violence in
Canadian courtrooms. . .includ[ing] discriminatory notions about
women’s sexual availability, and their own degree of culpability
(blameworthiness) in causing the sexual violence they experience.149

As the case of N.I. demonstrates, sexual assault can also be facilitated by digital
platforms, thus potentially constituting a form of technology-aggravated sexual
assault.150 This may further contribute to the barrier of reporting that Craig
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Department of Justice, ‘‘Just Facts — Sexual Assault” (18 December 2019), online:
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/jr/jf-pf/2019/apr01.html>.
Ibid.
Craig, supra note 39 at 9.
In 2011, 15-year-old Rehtaeh Parsons was sexually assaulted at a party in Nova Scotia.
This assault was aggravated by technology. A photo of her vomiting out of a window as a
boy (one of four boys who sexually assaulted her that night) raped her while giving a
‘‘thumbs up” was shared unremittingly on social media. It led to relentless online bulling.
Her life was forever changed. Rehtaeh Parsons attempted suicide by hanging, which lead
to a coma. Her life ended on April 7, 2013, when the decision to switch off life support was
made by her family. The lives of her family and friends were forever changed. An
independent report into her case found that the justice system failed on practically every
level and outlined a series of policies, procedures, and actions that ought to be taken in
respect of cyberbulling (a form of TFGBV), sexual violence, investigations, and
prosecutions. See Murray D Segal, ‘‘Independent Review of the Police and Prosecution
Response” (8 October 2015), online (pdf): <novascotia.ca/segalreport/Parsons-Independent-Review.pdf>. There are many, many more stories similar to that of Rehtaeh
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outlines, particularly if the role of technology in perpetuating sexual violence is
not properly understood.
Other case law involving Uber and sexual assault reveals increasing
violence.151 At the same time, however, we know from the work of Elizabeth
Sheehy and others that the extent of the impact on the complainant is not fully
captured in reports of cases of sexual violence.152 Even in obtaining transcripts
from case files, body language is often not described.153 Emotions such as crying
or sighing may also be omitted.154 Taking these points into account, along with
low reporting, the absence of the role of technology in facilitating sexual
violence, and the fact that many cases are settled with parties signing
confidentiality agreements,155 the case law does not tell us the extent of the
violence.
There are also cases where sexual offenders become Uber drivers in order to
further their means of sexual violence. For example, an Uber driver in San Diego
sexually assaulted an inebriated woman, K.P., when she was returning home
from a first date in 2016.156 K.P. reported the attack to police after she managed
to escape the driver’s vehicle, which led to the discovery of as many as 14 other
sexual assaults the accused had committed prior to becoming an Uber driver.
The driver had kept videos documenting his abuse. The women survivors ranged
in age from 13 to 21 years old.157 He had drugged many of them, and some of the
survivors were not even aware that they had been sexually assaulted until they
were told in the course of the investigation. The driver was found guilty of the
rape along with 33 other counts of sexual assault against women and children. 158
(ii) Uber passengers as perpetrators of TFGBV
In 2019, C.B., a single mother who was an Uber driver in the US, described
how a male passenger made several unwanted sexual advances, causing her to be
fearful.159 The passenger told her during the trip that he had a fantasy of having
151
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Teens”, Times of San Diego (8 November 2017), online: <timesofsandiego.com/crime/
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(29 January 2019), online: <www.bbc.com/news/technology-46990533>; Sam T Levin,
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sex with a single mother. When she dropped him off at his destination, he
recommended that she turn right in order to return to the main street; however,
he knew it was a cul-de-sac and that she would have to return to the location at
which she dropped him off. When she did, he was standing with his pants down,
masturbating. C.B. reported him to Uber, but, citing privacy reasons, Uber
would not provide her with information on whether the man’s access to the Uber
app had been deactivated or not.
What facilitated this sexual misconduct? What failed to ensure the safety of
the woman driver? Once again, the Uber platform.
Pressuring, manipulating, tricking, or threatening an individual for sexual
activity falls onto the spectrum of sexual misconduct and may constitute sexual
harassment. 160 Technology provides the means for breaking down the
boundaries of this type of abuse. It moves beyond the physical. Additionally,
willfully masturbating with the intent to continue harassing C.B. may be
considered an indecent act.161
In another incident in 2015, two male passengers attacked a driver, B.G., in a
fit of homophobic fury.162 B.G., who is lesbian, was verbally and physically
attacked. She suffered bodily injury, including two cracked front teeth. She
reported the incident to San Diego police, but Uber would not disclose the
identity of the passenger who booked the ride without a subpoena. She was told
the police detective was unable to get one without evidence beyond her
testimony. Her case was deactivated. Uber informed B.G. that she would not
have to worry about being paired with the passenger who booked the ride in the
future, but they would not confirm if he was banned generally, or if he was only
blocked from being assigned to B.G. (which would mean he could still potentially
harm other drivers).
What facilitated this act of irrational hatred? What failed, once again, to
ensure the safety of the woman driver? The Uber platform.
Assault under Canadian law covers a broad range of acts from implied threat
to actual physical harm requiring hospitalization.163 Technology shapes, extends,
and augments homophobia, which overlaps with gendered harm. These identity
markers — woman and lesbian — do not exist independently of one another.
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Each informs the other and may create a complicated combination of
oppression.
In another case in April 2021 involving one of Uber’s services — Uber Eats
— a transgender delivery driver, L.R., was forced to change his name on his app
to reflect his legal name — his legal ‘‘deadname” — rather than his legally
changed name and pronouns.164 This meant that L.R.’s app profile displayed a
name that he no longer used, effectively outing him as transgender. As a result,
L.R. experienced harassment when he delivered food to customers and feared for
his safety. The American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas intervened on L.R.’s
behalf and Uber apologized. Uber also made a change to its app so that the
option to display a self-identified first name appears without the need to display
one’s legal name.165 This, however, is a patch, not an actual solution to the issue
of discrimination and the violence associated with the app. Further, a complaint,
not unlike the hashtag campaigns against sexual harassment166 at Uber, is
required before action is taken rather than thinking about ethics in the design.
What was responsible for the discrimination in the Uber Eats registration
process? What facilitated the resulting micro-aggressions that L.R. suffered?
Again, the Uber platform.
Transphobia is another intersecting system of oppression that technology
amplifies. Its scale has escalated at an alarming rate.167 For instance, research
between 2016 and 2019 reveals that in US and UK, there were 8 transphobic
posts published online each minute.168 These discriminatory posts range from
harassment to calls for genocide of transgender people and their allies. 169
(iii) The spoke effect
Other instances show that it is not just the hub — or the platform — that
facilitates the gender-based violence, but also the network of technologies that
intersect with the hub. Thus, the TFGBV is compounded by a secondary
amplification. For instance, Doe v. Uber Techs, Inc.,170 in which an Uber driver
sexually assaulted a woman on the return to her dormitory in Boston after she
164
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lost consciousness from consuming too much alcohol at a social event, is an
example of how TFGBV can be compounded through another type of
technology. The survivor discovered some time after the sexual assault that the
Uber driver had also gained access to her smartphone during the trip. He had
added a fake profile to her Snapchat account, presumably for the purpose of
covert surveillance.
What facilitated the sexual assault? The Uber platform. Additionally, how
could this invasion of privacy occur? The technology intersecting with the Uber
platform.
In another instance, W.G., a woman driver in Los Angeles, California,
reported that a third-party tracking app such as Apple’s Find My iPhone171
allowed a male passenger to determine where she lived. Her home security
camera recorded the passenger and another individual at her home the morning
after she dropped him off. He alleged he left his phone inside her vehicle. When
W.G. called Uber to report the incident, she was told that the passenger would be
reminded of their community guidelines, but, citing privacy reasons, could not
share the results of their investigation into her complaint.
What enabled a third-party app to track W.G. to her home? Again, the Uber
platform. Furthermore, what left W.G. feeling unsafe? Once again, the
technology intersecting with the Uber platform.
In other instances, passengers have been able to find women Uber drivers on
Facebook and have attempted to contact them.172 On another occasion, a male
passenger reported that he had left behind an item in the car in which he travelled
in South Carolina. Uber asked the woman driver to follow up with the passenger.
She did so via text message, and he replied that, in fact, he did not lose anything,
but that he just wanted her number. Along with the text was an unsolicited video
of his penis.173
After each case analysis in this section, I have employed the rhetorical device
of repetition, asking some variation of ‘‘what enabled the harm“? The question
bears repeating to bring attention to the fact that the issue of technologyfacilitated gender-based sexual violence has not been adequately addressed. Time
after time, the Uber platform and the technologies that intersect with the
platform lie at the heart of the harm created in these cases. Over and over again,
Uber’s technology furthered or created opportunities for the gender-based sexual
violence experienced by both drivers and passengers. The scope of the sexual
violence is broadened by looking at the violence through an intersectional lens.
In bringing together the algorithmically regulated O2O platform and its
offline services — ride-sharing, food delivery, etc. — Uber was bringing together
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not only the best of online and offline worlds, but also the worst. This analysis
has shown that when these worlds collide, new problems are created that need to
be addressed. Taken together, this network of intersecting harms results in
ecosystemic TFGBV.

3. RECOGNIZING ECOSYSTEMIC TFGBV
Uber markets itself as a technology company that is managed primarily by
ML algorithms with the support of human engineers. Yet, in its 2019 Report, the
role that its technology played in relation to sexual violence is, for all intents and
purposes, absent. Likewise, solutions dealing specifically with the role of
technology in facilitating gender-based violence are also missing from the series
of initiatives in which Uber has invested that are aimed at preventing sexual
violence. Uber was not sufficiently rigorous in defining the problem it was trying
to solve. It was a missed opportunity that has resulted in continued harm. 174
There is equally a dearth of analysis in respect of how technology is used as a
tool by perpetrators to broaden the scope of sexual violence in the case law
involving Uber.175 This may suggest that the courts do not have the tools to deal
with the role that technology plays. Evidence of this can be found not only in
cases of sexual violence but elsewhere. Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller176 is a
good example. While the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision here ‘‘brought the
doctrine of unconscionability from the backburners to the forefront of contract
law,”177 the Court failed to recognize the fundamental role that technology
played in the case.178 Effectively, the Court left the role of technology in Uber,
on the backburners of contract law, when in fact it should have been at the
forefront.
This leads to the key question: what path should Uber take to deal with
TFGBV? Uber must recognize that to have an algorithm that is not toxic, it must
deal with its toxic environment. This change on the inside goes beyond leadership
reform and dismissals for unethical behaviour. It also goes beyond responding to
174
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contract involved 14 pages and two clicks to agree. However, there were many more steps
involved in agreeing to the contract, and, in fact, the contract itself was embedded within
the registration process to become an Uber Eats driver. It is a case that is fundamentally
about the role of technology, yet discussion of technology was effectively absent in the
decision. See Uber, supra note 176 at para 7.
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incidents only after they become public. And it extends past using more
technology, such as anti-sexual assault apps, which simply ends up putting
responsibility for risk avoidance on potential victims. 179
Uber must recognize that its technology facilitates gender-based violence and
intersects with other technologies that further exacerbate the violence. Uber must
come to terms with the fact that its problem with sexual violence is ecosystemic.
Uber’s culture was founded in sexual harassment and cover up, and its AI
systems were developed out of that discriminatory culture. The result was a toxic
environment that led to algorithmic bias. Uber’s objective was to allow clients to
hail a car with nothing but a smartphone. However, its toxic culture prevented it
from looking critically at its design process and at how that very objective could
harm someone. This was a failure.
Uber’s technology effectively operates in a corporate black box. We do not
know what data was used to build its algorithms. We are not sure how they were
designed. We do not know how the algorithms work. What we do know is that
Uber’s algorithms regulate its platform, and we know the end result: Uber’s hub
and spoke model enabled thousands of cases of gender-based violence, while also
allowing Uber itself to largely evade responsibility.
Recognizing ecosystemic TFGBV is, in part, educational. It means that, in
better understanding the gist of its problem, Uber will be able to effectively audit
its environment and its algorithms for bias and resulting harms. In other words,
Uber can address the harms that stem from its ‘‘hub” and those that intersect
with it — or, ‘‘spoke” harms. This will provide the opportunity to develop more
appropriate initiatives such as specific training on the role that technology plays
in facilitating gender-based violence. These initiatives will lessen Uber’s onlife
harms overall and further its commitment ‘‘to help[ing] stop incidents before they
happen.”180
Further, in recognizing and better understanding ecosystemic TFGBV, and
in dealing with it proactively rather than reactively as it has done in the past,
Uber has the opportunity to take on a bold role in the gig economy.
Recognizing ecosystemic TFGBV will also be beneficial in respect of redress.
If regulatory pressures are exerted, such as a new TFGBV-specialized agency, 181
Uber will be better positioned to respond to potential harms. It will be able to do
more than is possible in its current patchwork remedy approach.
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While high-profile class actions in other jurisdictions, such as in France, 182
have resulted in Uber reclassifying its drivers as employees rather than as
independent contractors, this change by itself has limited effectiveness in respect
of ecosystemic TFGBV. Under this reclassification, Uber drivers become
employees when they pick up passengers, but they stop being employees when
passengers are dropped off. This means that the protections offered by this
change in employment status are limited to the duration of the ride. We know
that many of the cases of passenger sexual violence occur when the Uber ride
ends or when the driver ends the ride. We also know that the end of the Uber ride
puts women drivers at risk. Simply changing the status of Uber drivers from
independent contractors to employees while the Uber app is turned on is not
sufficient to deal with ecosystemic TFGBV.
The class action currently being pursued in Ontario183 which seeks to
position Uber drivers as employees within the meaning of the Employment
Standards Act (ESA),184 however, has additional consequences. Existing health
and safety regulation in most provinces and territories in Canada requires
employers to implement workplace violence and harassment prevention
policies.185 This legislation requires employers to investigate and deal with its
workplace violence, including sexual violence. Employers have an obligation to
protect their workers, and this protection would extend beyond dropping off
passengers or turning off the Uber app.186 It also means that with each incident
of sexual violence, whether the Uber app is on or off, Uber will be required to
182
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investigate the allegation with a transparent process. Thus, if Uber better
understands ecosystemic TFGBV, it will be able to create a more effective
workplace violence policy that it will be required to implement should the class
action find Uber drivers to be employees within the meaning of the ESA.
Uber needs to face up to dealing with ecosystemic TFGBV. Only then can it
recode and rebuild its onlife platform to comply with potential external pressures
on a very simple, yet importantly modified, idea: hail a car safely with nothing
but a smartphone.

